I doubt that anyone has not first and intuitively, viscerally responded at his first encounter with Ockham’s Razor but with a flash of recognition and agreement.
Why? Why is parsimony alluring? Why does it feel to us a reliable guide to reliable understanding?
It’s not just that explanations employing fewer entities are easier to handle. It’s not just a matter of economy of cerebral operations. There is that, to be sure, but there is more to it than that. For, there could not be any true increase in economy of cerebral operations unless there was really a prior economy of ontology, to which the cerebral operations corresponded. An increase of economy of cerebral operations that had no bearing on the real operanda denoted by the operans thereof could not be nice, could not feel good; for, it could offer no hedonic payoff that was veridical. All its hedonic payoffs would be noise, and useless, and so would have been culled by natural selection, or good common sense, or the urge to increase efficiency of cerebral operations – to think better and more logically, more consistently (these are all different ways of indicating the same thing).
Our preference for economy in explanation is a correlate of the Hamiltonian Least Path that nature ever takes (mutatis mutandis). It tracks reality.
OK, so; on Ockham’s Razor, to what explanation do all others reduce, and tend? The one with the fewest entities, no?
OK, which explanation has the fewest entities?
Theism.
The most parsimonious explanation of all things, to which all partial explanations reduce and tend, is the One.
+++++
The atheist could respond by saying that his explanation has zero explanatory entities, and so is more parsimonious than theism. But the zero of explanatory entities is the zero of explanation; so that, in so saying, the atheist has agreed that reality is radically unintelligible, and that he himself is therefore an ignoramus.
If parsimony were our only index of explanatory excellence, the atheist would have a point. But he doesn’t, because it isn’t. Beauty, power, elegance, scope, and generalizability are other criteria of excellent theories. There are many others.
The Orthosphere 
Ockham who didn’t invent his razor, used the pedestalization of parsimony to argue, contra Aquinas, that human reason can’t prove the existence of God, and that universals aren’t real. The false claim that the argument from parsimony (against “pluralism”) is the be all and end all of philosophical thought is dealt with directly by Aquinas in his argument for the existence of God.
It is a mistake to idolize parsimony. Doing so tends to improper reduction: to parsimony so severe that the explanation of x explains x away altogether.
But idolizing any of the other criteria of excellence in theories can engender problems of a different sort. E.g., explanatory power, which when it is encountered sometimes engenders an enthusiasm that verges upon mania; the powerful theory then becomes in the hands of the investigator a hammer in search of nails, and then finding things all over the place that look pretty doggone close to nails. Natural selection is one such. It seems to explain almost everything, until one realizes that all it does is state the obvious, indeed the tautological: things that succeed perdure, and things that fail die off. How not?
Elegance is another temptation. Ideas are more or less beautiful, and the beautiful ideas are more appealing to the intellect than the ugly. But that alone does not make them true. E.g., universalism.