In a libertarian society, everyone agrees to disagree, and to leave each other alone in their disagreements. It would not be important that people should leave each other pretty much alone, so that each might go his own way as he saw fit, unless they had no cult in common, that brought them naturally to agreement about how best to live life. The purely libertarian society is the zero of commensality, and of ecclesiality. There is in the purely libertarian society no gathering, no agora; for, even the disputations of the agora presupposed a basic patriotism under the bonds of extended familiarity.
Libertarianism then is identity politics reduced to its limit: the individual. In the purely libertarian society, every man is a faction. Libertarianism is a cease fire in a Hobbesian war of all against all.
But it is at best a cease fire; the war continues, and threatens ever to boil over.
The Peace of Westphalia was libertarian in this sense. Princes could go their own religious way, by each other and the Pope unmolested; and so likewise could everyone within their lands go his own way unmolested. The Peace was the defenestration of cult as an important factor of national character. It was thus a praeparatio for the elimination of nations. It was the first step toward the EU; toward, i.e., tyranny.
Libertarianism is ever the precursor to tyranny. For, it proposes the maximum proliferation of disparate cults, that – precisely because they are compelling cults respecting First Things – cannot but condemn and abjure each other, and wish each other deleted, and so sooner or later find themselves at hot war. Tyranny then is needed, to maintain social order.
The maximum of unconstrained individual liberty requires a tyrannical rule of law. It requires anarcho-tyranny, in which no one is allowed to offend anyone else.
In a society characterized by a strong national commitment to the national cult, libertarian ukases against interfering with other people are simply irrelevant; inapposite; superfluous. No one worries about his own rights vis-à-vis the rights of others when everyone agrees about how things ought properly to be done. Liberties then, and rights, are in such cultures simply not an issue that occurs to anyone to worry about. There is in a coinherent cultic society no *problem* of social adjustment of the individual to the group, and no need therefore to protect the individual from the interference of the group. Nor then likewise is there any reason to devise a way that the verdicts of individuals can be fairly expressed in the dictates of the state. In a strong cultic society, the individual finds in his participation of the group the fullest expression of his own individual will to goodness; he pursues his own happiness by pursuing the agenda of his group as it pertains to him; and his group coordinates the acts of its member individuals in such a way as to optimize their personal happiness, mutatis mutandis. Cults care for their members, and vice versa. Or else, they die: cults and their members, too. Under a common cult, group and individual then are, not at war, but at peace, in their mutual agreement each emphasizing and glorifying and magnifying and helping the other.
In no way does that sort of social peace constitute an elimination of the individual, or his immersion in the ocean of the society. On the contrary; that sort of disappearance and moral meaninglessness of the individual – of his alienation, loneliness, and anomie, ending at last in despair – is far more prevalent and dire in societies that have no strong common cult, wherein libertarian protections are therefore so crucial.
In a society with a strong cult, individuals are more apparent, more meaningful, their idiosyncratic differences glorified by contrast with their basic agreements, and magnified in virtue of their basic agreements. In a society coordinated under the aegis of a strong cult, individuals then are more at liberty than they could have been in a disordered libertarian society.
There is a strong analogy here to royal monarchy: in no other form of government than royal monarchy might any man’s personal liberties be more secure, or more broad. Likewise, only as constrained under the terms of a common cult, that sets the proper bounds of the social solution space, might any man move properly, and thus powerfully and freely.