English makes it easy to refer to a whole group of things as if it were a substantial entity in its own right, whether or not it really is. It then allows us to assign such things as motives, plans, and behavior to that merely notional entity. Thus, e.g., “Baseball been very very good to me;” “The Wehrmacht has taken Paris;” “Godless Communism killed 100 million.”
It’s handy. But difficulty can ensue when we take our shorthand references to such groups as if they indicated something concretely real. The game of baseball can’t do anything, nor can the Wehrmacht, or Communism. Clemente was treated well by actual people involved in baseball, Paris was taken by German soldiers, and the victims of the Communist holocaust were destroyed by real men and women. It’s a category error to blame or credit merely notional entities. AN Whitehead called it the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. It arises when we treat ideas as if they were actual and concrete. Concrete entities do all inherit ideas from their past, embody them, and propose them to the future. But without a concrete entity to do the inheriting, embodying, and proposing, nothing happens with the ideas. Ideas don’t have themselves.
Ideas are indeed causes, to be sure; the final, formal and material causes of events are all ideas, in the final analysis. But the inputs to an event are not yet the event. Only agents can respond to the ideas that are their factors. It behooves us then to remember to assign responsibility to natural persons, rather than to movements or schools, to philosophies or merely legal persons.
Notwithstanding all that, it is interesting that there are some such group identifications that truly do refer to really subsistent actualities: e.g., a human body, the Church, and so forth. The bee hive, the man of war, the termite mound, the ant hill, the plant, and the fungus may too all fall under this category. All are collectives, but all are collected in and as members of a single concrete entity, that stamps its character upon all its subsidiary occasions – whether or not they realize it. Such collective entities – Whitehead calls them nexūs – are all bodies. They have corporeal existence in their own right, gaining and losing members from one moment to the next.
Most interesting of all is that such bodies are not perhaps best thought of as material “stuff.” They are not solids, the same all the way through. They are, rather, distributed, occurring wherever and whenever their members occur. Thus the body of a human person is arrayed over a large volume of space and time, in which there are many emptinesses, many gaps. Corporeal bodies in our cosmos are of course mostly empty space. This is to say that their loci of concrete actuality are dispersed across a large and merely geometrical extensive continuum – “merely,” because mostly inactual. But more than that, the embodiment of the human person can be distributed between this world and another.
When we think of embodiment this way, it can be easier to understand the Body of the Lord, which is mystical, spread across Earth and Heaven, and ex hypothesi all worlds whatever. Wherever his members are, there he is; wherever his elements are, there he is. At the same time, he is embodied in Jesus of Nazareth, who has hair, and eats, and can run or smile.
There is no contradiction between the material embodiment of the Logos in Jesus and his mystical embodiment in the Church, in the bodies of believers, and in the bread and wine of the Eucharist.
Is there then any reason that would prevent him from having many such bodies as he has in Jesus, of whatever type? Or, is there any reason why he could not be actual in and as an angel – Michael or Melchizedek – at the same time that he is actual in Jesus, and in a congregation of two men huddled in prayer, and wherever he is called down to material corporeality by such congregations and their priests? I can’t think of one.
 Or, “English makes it easy …”