Behavior as such is predicated upon the orderliness of the world. The acts of organisms are avowals of confidence that the acts themselves are appropriate to the world; that they make sense in terms of the way that the world is ordered. My walk to the store is an effectual assertion that there is indeed still really a store, that my path will still take me to it, that it usually offers for sale the items I need, and so forth. Likewise for a cow heading home to her stall from the pasture. Likewise even for the phototropism of plants. Behavior is a commitment to the truth of an idea.
That such behaviors as phototropism are informed and, even, driven by their factors in the anterior world does not vitiate their philosophical meanings. That the factors of acts are all orderly, and that acts are ordered to ends in view of – i.e., derived from and informed by – the orderliness of their factors, and toward an unknowable state of future affairs which it is presumed will manifest that same orderliness, does not somehow mean that actors themselves are less ordered than their worlds. That agents are integral with their worlds does not mean that they are not actors, or that their acts have no meanings or intentions or significations in respect to those worlds. If I get the idea of going to the store from an advertisement, that does not mean that it was not I that got the idea of going to the store. It isn’t the advertisement that is going to the store. Likewise, it isn’t the warmth and comfort of the stall that is heading home from the pasture, nor is it the sun that is turning its face toward the sun.
Recall then that unless the order of the world is ultimately founded upon an eternal rock of order, that cannot change in respect to its orderliness, all the apparent orderliness of the world is really only happenstance at bottom. If there is no ultimate standard of order, then there is no way, even in principle, to tell when we have encountered order. Either orderliness goes all the way down to an ultimate ground of order, or it isn’t there at all.
Notice now that the ultimate standard of order cannot be at all effectual if it is merely notional. To exert any effect, it must be real, and concrete: it must be actual. It’s no good to head toward the store if in fact it isn’t good to head to the store. The good must be real, to be in any way whatever. And this is but to say that the ultimate foundation and standard of order must be concrete and actual in some substantial entity; the principle of all order must be the order, first, of a First Principal.
All behavior, then, presupposes the truth of theism.